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Abstract. The CESAR project1 aims at elaborating 
a Reference Technology Platform usable across 
several application domains (Aeronautics, 
Automotive, Industrial Automation, Railway and 
Space) for the cost effective development and 
validation of safety related embedded systems. 
Safety and, more generally, dependability are 
therefore major topics addressed by the project. 
This paper focuses on the work performed on safety 
requirements and approaches to be supported by a 
common Reference Technology Platform. We 
analyse and compare the industrial practice, 
applicable standards and state of the art so as to 
identify which and how safety views should be 
supported. This is achieved in particular through the 
incorporation of the necessary safety concepts in 
the CESAR Meta Model. We then focus on the 
major axes investigated by the project, formal 
model-based techniques for requirements 
engineering and component-based engineering. 
Incremental realisations and case studies confirm 
the interest and provide refined requirements for the 
final version of the platform. 
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1 The CESAR project (“Cost efficient methods and 
processes for safety relevant embedded systems”) has 
received funding from the ARTEMIS Joint 
Undertaking under grant agreement n° 100016 and 
from specific national programs and/or funding 
authorities. 
1   Introduction 
The industry of safety critical embedded systems 
faces difficult challenges with more and more 
complex systems with more and more functions and 
interacting functions, very strong requirements on 
safety and safety justification, and very strong 
constraints on cost and time-to-market. 
In this context, advanced engineering methods 
appear as very promising, in particular formal 
model-based methods addressing requirements 
engineering and component-based engineering. 
Building on these approaches, the CESAR 
European project (Joint Undertaking ARTEMIS) 
gathers more than 50 partners from academia, 
technology providers and industrial end-users from 
five application domains (Aeronautics, Automotive, 
Industrial Automation, Railway and Space). They 
aim at elaborating a Reference Technology 
Platform (RTP) usable across several application 
domains for the cost effective development and 
validation of safety related embedded systems. 
Safety and, more generally, dependability are 
therefore major topics addressed by the project. 
This paper reports on the objectives, work and 
current achievements of the project from the safety 
point of view. This encompasses a survey of 
standards, state of the practice and of the art, the 
incorporation of the safety concepts in the CESAR 
Meta Model, and the elaboration and 
implementation of solutions in requirements 
engineering and component-based engineering. 
Assessments on industrial use cases provide refined 
requirements for the final version of the RTP. 
2    State of the art and of the practice 
Altogether the academic, technology and industrial 
partners of the CESAR project elaborated a 
collection and synthesis of the state of the practice 
and state of the art in safety related embedded 
systems in all five application domains covered by 
the project: aeronautics, automotive, industrial 
automation, railway and space, addressing the 
applicable standards, the industrial practice, state of 
the art, and identifying the support expected from 
the CESAR Reference Technology Platform, in 
particular under the form of “safety views”. 
2.1    Safety standards 
In terms of safety, the concern of this paper, we 
especially focused on the safety standards 
applicable to the target application domains and to 
their analysis and comparison: 
• Aeronautics: Eurocae/SAE documents 
ED-79A/ARP-4754A “Guidelines for 
Development of Civil Aircraft and 
Systems” [1] with the complements on 
methods and techniques ED-135/ARP-
4761 “Guidelines and methods for 
conducting the safety assessment 
process on civil airborne systems and 
equipment” [2], completed by the 
Eurocae/RTCA documents on software 
(ED-12B/DO-178B “Software 
considerations in airborne systems and 
equipment certification” [3] and ED-
80/DO-254 “Design Assurance 
Guidance for Airborne Electronic 
Hardware” [4]); 
• Automotive: the new standard, 
published in 2011, ISO 26262 “Road 
vehicles – Functional safety” [5]; 
• Industrial automation: the generic 
standard IEC 61508 “Functional safety 
of electrical/electronic/ programmable 
electronic safety-related systems” [6] 
and its derived standards such as IEC 
61511 “Functional safety – Safety 
instrumented systems for the process 
industry sector” [7]; 
• Railway: the EN CENELEC standards 
50126 (“Railway applications – The 
specification and demonstration of 
reliability, availability, maintainability 
and safety (RAMS)”) [8], 50128 
(“Railway applications – 
Communications, signalling and 
processing systems – Software for 
railway control and protection 
systems”) [9] and 50129 (“Railway 
applications – Communications, 
signalling and processing systems – 
Safety related electronic systems for 
signalling”) [10]; 
• Space the ECSS standards Q30 (“Space 
product assurance – dependability”) 
[11], Q40 (“Space product assurance – 
safety”) [12] and Q80 (“Space product 
assurance – software”) [13]. 
Even though there are differences in the 
standards applicable to the various domains, there 
are also many strong common principles and 
approaches [14], confirming the interest of a 
common platform to support the development and 
validation of safety-critical or safety-related 
embedded systems in the various domains. In 
particular all analysed standards propose a top-
down risk-based approach and the consideration of 
several levels or categories for the consequences of 
failures and therefore categories for the systems and 
elements. This leads in particular to categories of 
requirements applicable to the development and 
assurance in consideration of the severity of failure 
consequences and associated overall occurrence 
probability of a system failure. 
There are however also many differences, for 
instance in the details of the rules to allocate 
categories along the design, as well as on the 
architecture principles (e.g., with focus on 
“integrated safety” in aeronautics and automotive 
versus “external safety monitoring” in automation, 
rail and space), on the nature of the standards (e.g., 
prescriptive in terms of objectives versus means, or 
promoting explicitly or not the safety demonstration 
under the form of a “safety case”). Consequently 
the CESAR Reference Technology Platform cannot 
be a single common platform shared “as is” by all 
users, but rather a generic platform with all 
necessary facilities to be instantiated in each 
domain taking into consideration also the various 
industrial practices as well as the most promising 
methods and tools to support the development of 
safety critical embedded systems and in particular 
formal model-based and component-based 
approaches for requirements engineering and 
development. 
2.2    Safety process and methods: the safety 
views 
Industrial practice, following applicable standards, 
has developed and implemented a safety approach 
based on a strong process combining a global top-
down safety construction and assurance process, 
supported by several methods and techniques 
aiming at supporting the elaboration and evaluation 
of architecture solutions and their implementation. 
The support that the CESAR Reference Technology 
Platform is expected to provide to these safety 
process, methods and techniques can be described 
through the notion of safety views and viewpoints. 
Following IEEE 1471 [15] we define a view as 
“a representation of a whole system from the 
perspective of a related set of concerns”, and a 
viewpoint as “a specification of the conventions for 
constructing and using a view; a pattern or 
template from which to develop individual views by 
establishing the purposes and audience for a view 
and the techniques for its creation and analysis”. 
Therefore a view conforms to a viewpoint that 
establishes the conventions by which this view is 
depicted, created and analysed. The viewpoint 
determines the languages to be used to describe the 
view, and any associated modelling method or 
analysis technique to be applied to the view. So, a 
viewpoint is described by objectives, a set of 
concerns, modelling and language features and 
analytic methods. A view may consist of several 
models, and a model may participate in several 
views. 
 
In the context of this work we propose the 
relevant safety and dependability views and 
viewpoints based on the identification of the 
relevant safety and dependability analysis 
techniques, and on which models these analyses 
could be performed. Therefore a safety and 
dependability viewpoint is defined as: 
• A model i.e., a set of information and 
their inter-relationships, with formal 
semantics of information and relations 
(the modelling and language features 
that allow performing the analyses of 
concern), 
• A set of analytic methods that can be 
applied to the model so as to analyse 
and assess some predefined safety and 
dependability properties. 
 
Various categories of safety and dependability 
analysis techniques can be identified, corresponding 
to various categories of objectives, depending on 
the different stakeholders concerned with the safety 
of the system to be developed. Depending on the 
domain the stakeholders may be represented by 
different roles in the development process: e.g. a 
dedicated quality or safety manager is compliant 
with the standards applicable for the domain. 
Within the development process they also represent 
certification authorities, as well as customers 
concern with respect to safety. 
 
Additionally, safety is a concern across the 
different engineering phases, implying various 
approaches depending on the development phase 
addressed. Early stages of the safety lifecycle aim 
at the identification of requirements and exploration 
of the implications of design whereas later lifecycle 
stages focus on the successful implementation of 
the requirements. Typical safety analysis techniques 
as in particular required by safety standards 
include: 
• Hazard analysis and risk assessment, 
• System Safety Assessment, generally 
supported by Fault Tree Analysis, 
Failure Modes, Effects (and Criticality) 
Analysis, Common Cause Analysis, 
etc., 
• Verification and validation, in particular 
of the implementation of safety and 
functional safety requirements. 
These various safety analysis techniques can be 
classified, taking into consideration different 
categories of their objectives: 
Quantitative (probabilistic) assessment of safety 
and dependability properties: 
The purpose is to evaluate global probabilistic 
properties of a system (or of a part of it) based on 
its architecture (especially in terms of 
redundancies) and a set of assumptions on the 
stochastic distribution of failures that can affect the 
system and its elements. There are numerous 
modelling approaches and associated tools such as 
Markov Chains, Reliability Block Diagrams, Fault 
Trees etc., and component failure rate data bases. 
Even though some difficulties and limitations may 
exist, they are mainly related to the relevance of the 
component failure rates (for which model-based 
approaches in the sense of the study are of little 
support if any) rather than on the capability to 
combine them and evaluate safety and 
dependability probabilistic properties at a higher 
level. Nevertheless in case of complex system 
architecture and reconfiguration mechanisms, 
elaborating a model to conduct these evaluations 
remain tedious and error prone. It is therefore 
expected that the CESAR RTP will provide 
facilities to support the elaboration of such models. 
Qualitative (descriptive and/or deterministic) 
assessment of propagation of faults and failures 
and of the effects of this propagation: 
This corresponds to a very important and large set 
of analyses of the effectiveness of detection and 
protection mechanisms against faults and their 
combinations, analyses of common mode failures 
or common cause faults and their effects, etc. This 
must be a major target for CESAR considering the 
importance of the associated objectives and the 
limitations of the currently used techniques (e.g., 
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis, 
Fault Tree Analysis and various check-lists). An 
assisted, if not automated, generation of the 
analysis reports from an engineering model 
annotated with the relevant information about fault 
occurrence and propagation is expected to be 
particularly useful. 
Assessment (correctness, performance) of fault 
tolerance mechanisms: 
Similarly to the correctness or performance 
assessment of any function, model-based 
approaches can be used provided they represent the 
behaviour of the function as well as, for 
performance evaluation, its utilisation of the 
relevant resources with respect to the target 
evaluation (time, memory, etc.). This can also be 
identified as an important target for CESAR 
because of the current difficulties and limitations of 
the definition and validation techniques applicable 
to fault tolerance mechanisms. Precisely these 
difficulties come from the increasing complexity of 
the fault tolerance mechanisms and their detailed 
behaviour, taking into account multiple interactions 
between a large number of elements (and moreover 
in nominal and degraded conditions). 
Soundness, completeness of the safety and 
dependability arguments: 
Formal models could be used to represent and 
check the safety and dependability logical 
argumentation (how the various pieces of evidence 
are logically combined to support a high level 
safety or dependability claim). This is mentioned 
here mainly for completeness because despite its 
interest in general and its possible inclusion among 
the topics addressed by the CESAR project, it is 
very different in nature from the techniques 
addressed by the study in the sense that the 
concerned models are specific to the considered 
safety and dependability analysis, rather than 
engineering models (even augmented and annotated 
with safety and dependability specific information). 
Finally we can identify three main categories of 
objectives of safety analyses, corresponding to a 
priori three categories of safety models, structural 
safety models, behavioural safety models and 
logical safety models. 
Structural safety models 
Structural models are often used as a support to the 
engineering activities, to represent the organisation 
of the various elements composing a system (at 
various abstract levels: functions, sub-systems, 
equipment, software, etc. and from the early 
definition and design phases to the implementation, 
verification and validation). Structural models can 
be extended to represent how the faults and failures 
affect the various elements of the structure, and 
how these faults and failures propagate along the 
structure. Such augmented models are good 
candidates to support, possibly through coupling 
with classical existing safety and dependability 
analysis tools, the analysis of fault propagation and 
demonstration of the related requirements (e.g., all 
single faults can be handled through automatic 
reconfiguration, or switch to survival mode, no 
combination of two independent faults can have 
catastrophic consequences, etc.). Of course not all 
the characteristics of fault propagation can be easily 
represented on structural engineering models (e.g., 
thermal, electromagnetic compatibility, etc.). The 
methods and support, object of the project, are not 
expected to solve all the difficulties but at least a 
significant part. 
At minimum it is expected that the CESAR RTP 
provides support to the classical analysis techniques 
as requested by the various safety standards and in 
particular Hazard Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis and 
FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis). It is worth noting that according to the 
definition we proposed, the above mentioned 
analysis techniques or more precisely their 
underlying formalism (fault trees, FMECA sheets) 
could be considered as “safety viewpoints” in the 
sense that they describe information and their 
relation, with a (more or less) rigorous semantics, 
and support analysis in the sense of the assessment 
of properties such as for instance the minimum 
number of faults leading to some feared event. 
However, all these techniques (and some other such 
as Event Trees, HAZOP (Hazard and Operability 
studies), etc.) are based on the same fundamental 
principle (the expression and processing of the 
propagation of faults). Previous work has 
confirmed that fault propagation can be 
appropriately described on structural models, very 
close to the models of the system architecture as 
used in system engineering with some additional 
properties associated to the system elements (how 
they fail, how they react to faults) and links. In 
particular it is possible to extract automatically 
from such enriched structural models the more 
specialised models for safety analysis such as fault 
trees or FMECA sheets. 
We therefore propose to not focus on these 
specialised models and consider principally this 
more general structural model as a safety 
viewpoint. It is expected from the CESAR RTP to 
support the elaboration of this viewpoint, in full 
consistence with the engineering models, and 
support the extraction from it of specialised models 
such as FMECA and fault trees, and the assessment 
of safety properties as needed by end-users. 
Behavioural safety models 
Behavioural models are often used as a support for 
the engineering activities, more and more used 
thanks to the improvements of the associated tools 
allowing formal verification of behavioural 
properties i.e., the correctness of the behaviour even 
in case of complex behaviour with many 
interactions between a large number of elements 
and a large number of possible combinations of 
events and states. Fault tolerance is generally a 
difficult case in this respect, and moreover the 
severity of consequences of potential failures of the 
fault tolerance mechanisms may be very high. 
Logical safety models 
Though not required explicitly by all safety 
standards (but notable exceptions are in railway and 
automotive domains), the notion of safety case is 
very useful to organise and check the safety 
arguments and claims. Be it called or not a “safety 
case”, the formal expression of the logical structure 
of the arguments (safety objectives, claims, 
assumptions etc.) corresponds clearly to a “safety 
viewpoint” and is of practical interest for end-users. 
Moreover experience, formalisms and tools (such 
as around the Goal Structured Notation) are 
available in this area. 
3    Integration of Safety Views – The CESAR 
Meta-Model 
The Cesar Meta Model (CMM) is used as the 
unified representation of concepts used for 
modelling systems and performing analyses across 
domain boundaries. Therefore not only the support 
of the different safety standards but also the 
compliance to existing system design 
methodologies is an inevitable requirement. 
The aim of the CMM is to unify architectural 
model of the system and the safety views (see 
section 2.2) to allow a coherent use within the 
safety processes (see section 4). Therefore, due to 
the particular nature of fault tolerance behaviour 
(with inputs and outputs directly from and to the 
system structure and fault propagation), it is of 
major interest that the CESAR RTP supports the 
expression and processing of fault tolerance 
behaviour directly and formally coupled to the 
structural safety model itself directly, and formally 
coupled to the (engineering) architectural model(s) 
of the system, properly enriched with the necessary 
information on fault propagation. 
Fault occurrence and fault tolerance behaviour 
needs to be defined locally for the elements of the 
system. To guarantee a decomposable design for 
the safety aspects as well for the other system views 
the concept of Components2 is used in the CMM. 
Components consist of interfaces which are not 
only used to communicate between components, 
but also – under the safety view – to propagate 
failures between them. Contracts allow specifying 
the behaviour of these components with respect to 
the defined interface consisting of differently typed 
ports. The typically used textual representation (see 
section 5) of the specification/requirements is 
separated into an assumption – stating the expected 
behaviour of the components environment – and a 
promise – stating the behaviour of the component 
itself. This is in particular useful for the safety view 
since e.g., expected driver actions and environment 
                                                          
2  In this section the relevant meta-model concepts are set 
in italic 
conditions can be directly modelled, although this 
concept is generally available to all other views. 
This interface and locality based handling of 
requirements and specifications allow a 
compositionality needed by the different identified 
safety analysis techniques (see section 2.2). 
Furthermore, to allow the integration of the 
different system representation, the design space is 
separated into multiple perspectives displaying the 
system at different structural stages. This structure 
allows representing the functional and logical 
architecture of a system as well as the allocation to 
technical components and their geometrical 
arrangement consistently in a single model, as it is 
required for an integrated safety assessment.  
The safety view of the CMM is illustrated by 
looking at the safety-related concepts relevant to 
three main phases of the safety lifecycle: the 
analysis of hazards and associated risks, the 
development of a safety concept, and the 
deployment of safety-related functions. 
 
Hazards are modelled as (unintended) 
interactions between the system, its environment, 
and its operator(s), and – as each of these can 
contribute to a hazard (by system failures, adverse 
environment conditions, and operator failures) – 
the system, environment and operator elements are 
equipped with corresponding failure attributes. 
Analyses are possible and partly implemented, to 
quantify the impact of these three factors on the 
hazards and – for instance – to check whether 
suitable requirements for safety mechanisms have 
been defined for the system to ensure 
mitigation/avoidance of these hazards. Similarly, it 
is possible to derive (requirements for) operational 
procedures ensuring such mitigation/avoidance. 
For the representation of a safety concept it is 
necessary to show how safety mechanisms cope 
with failures of functions and components and to 
check these against the hazard mitigation/avoidance 
requirements. Therefore all elements of the system 
model (functions, technical components like H/W, 
S/W, and mechanical elements) are equipped with 
faults (representing the initial undesired event), 
errors (difference between the specified and the 
measured condition), and failures (a 
component/system does not fulfil its purpose 
anymore). Having enriched components with these 
additional safety-related elements it is possible to 
specify safety mechanisms (see section 2.2), which 
typically consist of detection and reaction 
capabilities. Detection is consequently related to 
errors while reaction is tightly coupled to operating 
mode management. Therefore the definition of the 
nominal, different degraded modes as well as the 
(possibly multiple) safe states is imperative. 
Explicitly modelling safety mechanisms as such is 
not only beneficial for the automation of analyses 
but is also required by safety standards (in 
particular ISO 26262) since a definition of the 
system without any safety related features has to be 
stated. The main achievement is not only the 
integration of conceptual safety elements in an 
integrated system design space but providing an 
expressiveness to validate assigned safety 
requirements resulting from a hazard and risk 
assessment. 
 
When deploying safety related functions, it is 
necessary to obey allocation constraints from 
existing safety analysis. No additional meta-model 
elements are required. However, it is necessary to 
formulate requirements expressing the absence of 
common causes. But, being able to represent the 
technical architecture as well as the geometrical 
arrangement and dimension of the elements, the 
common cause analysis can be well supported and 
automated e.g. by integrating existing methods 
shown in [16]. Furthermore the impact by newly 
introduced technical constraints can be evaluated 
for the safety view as well for the nominal 
functionality. 
 
Besides the definition of the elements directly 
related to the design phases it is also demanded by 
several safety standards to create a certain level of 
test and verification coverage on the system. V&V-
Cases model the verification and validation tasks 
together with their results. 
 
Main goal for the development of safety-specific 
meta-model artefacts is the creation of a design 
space that is capable of integrating elements needed 
for the safety assessment in a consistent manner 
with the other system views. This approach eases 
the difficulties resulting from the overlap of the 
safety view with other aspects like real-time or 
functional behaviour. This first set of identified 
elements is a promising starting point for the further 
development of safety concept formalization. 
4    Safety process 
One of the safety activities within the CESAR 
project is the modelling of a safety process, as 
enforced by applicable standards and implemented 
in industrial practice. Processes are usually 
arranged orthogonal to organizational structures, 
thus spreading across several organizational units of 
different domains. In terms of embedded systems, 
the development of hardware and software usually 
follows well-proven development processes, often 
based on several years of experience. Therefore 
changes are to be made carefully. The assurance of 
functional safety features is achieved by embedding 
related activities to the currently running 
development processes. To achieve this, several 
steps need to be carried out. 
4.1    Challenges of Process Modelling 
First, a detailed analysis of the safety process is 
performed. The first part of this analysis, for 
automotive, is based on the ISO 26262: Road 
vehicles – Functional Safety [5]. This new standard 
covers all activities during the life cycle of safety 
related electrical/electronic systems in passenger 
cars, and was released in 2011. While IEC 61508 
[6] was considered for a wide range of 
electrical/electronic systems, ISO 26262 clearly 
aims at the automotive industry and affects original 
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and suppliers. 
The core parts of ISO 26262 are covering main 
areas of product development, starting with a 
concept phase and the product development at the 
system level, including system specification, 
integration and validation activities. Furthermore, 
product development at the hardware level and 
product development at the software level are 
covered. Additional parts are describing 
requirements and recommendations for production 
and operation, supporting processes and ASIL 
oriented safety analyses. The concept of ASIL 
(automotive safety integrity level) is derived from 
the idea of SIL (safety integrity levels, IEC 61508), 
and is used to classify hazards, based on their 
severity (S), controllability (C) and exposure (E) for 
a number of relevant situations. Depending on the 
necessary level of confidence, the methods applied 
during the item development may vary. This fact 
introduces great variability to development 
processes. ISO 26262 defines work products as 
results of single tasks, which may be input to other 
tasks. Therefore, work products create strong 
dependencies between all parts and domains of the 
standard. A work product can be a new separate 
document or just a reference to an existing 
document. For the latter case, an appropriate 
mapping is required. 
For the analysis of ISO 26262, all its clauses and 
requirements were translated to applicable practices 
and concrete activities to be performed by the 
industrial organizations. This means that the 
requirements of the standard were regrouped to 
activities that are described, assigned to different 
roles, and associated with their corresponding 
inputs, outputs and potential necessary tools. To 
perform this step, a spreadsheet, so-called “safety 
framework”, was developed, based on the 
previously outlined core parts of ISO 26262. 
Figure 2 shows an excerpt of the safety 
framework. Note that the information contained in 
the spreadsheet is split into two different font types: 
The bold information evolves directly from 
standard (e.g. columns “Phase”, “Sub-phase”, 
“Objectives”, “Work products”, “Activities”), 
whereas normal font is the interpretation and 
explanation that is developed in CESAR (e.g. 
columns “Related project input / documentation”, 
“What Method / Action brief description”, 
“Tools”). For legibility reasons only an excerpt of 
the framework is presented here: For example, only 
the column “Inputs” is included. However, the 
same kind of information is provided in the 
complete safety framework for the outputs as well. 
Other information not visible in figure 2 is the 
assignment of roles. ISO 26262 makes no 
assumptions on roles within the safety life cycle. 
Therefore we introduce a role model, featuring all 
necessary roles from different technical domains, 
categorizing them to responsible and supporting 
roles, reducing the imminent risk of ambiguities. 
After this first analysis focused on the 
automotive domain, the resulting safety framework 
is now being extended to other domains with the 
analysis of their applicable standards [1-4], [6-13]. 
Common properties and methods are identified, in 
order to broaden the framework’s spectrum. 
Spreadsheets provide a great overview and carry 
valuable information. However it is difficult for 
engineers to derive further information from them: 
Relationships between activities, roles, and other 
process artefacts are hard to track. Moreover, the 
representation of workflows is hardly possible and 
element instances may not be created. Process 
modelling languages do provide these features, 
bringing the safety framework closer to its 
application. 
4.2    The CESAR Approach to Process 
Modelling  
The CESAR Practice Framework aims at finding 
new ways for the description and modelling of 
development processes and practices. The Software 
and Systems Process Engineering Metamodel 
(SPEM) [17] is used to define all necessary entities. 
Based on SPEM, the Eclipse Process Framework 
(EPF) Composer [18] is used to realize the vision 
of a versatile process framework, assisting process 
engineers and developers from the early beginning 
of safety related projects. The Automotive Safety 
Framework is targeted at the needs of the 
automotive domain and will integrate seamlessly to 
the practice framework, thanks to agreed modelling 
standards and concepts [19]. Starting with the 
previously described safety framework table, a 
mapping between the contained descriptions and 
the elements provided by the practice 
framework/EPF was established. 
EPF supports various modelling concepts, 
allowing storing elements in packages and method 
plugins. Most important concepts are affecting 
reusability and extensibility. These properties are 
preserved by creating base plugins, which hold 
generic definitions. These are extended later on by 
the creation of assign plugins. EPF’s variability 
feature was used to create relations between the 
elements of these two plugins. This modelling 
strategy was used to achieve a complete library of 
tasks, roles and work products, separated into 
different packages according to the core parts of 
ISO 26262. Furthermore, EPF has proven to be 
usable for the representation of quality related 
attributes [20], thus all ASIL related methods of 
ISO 26262 are represented as guidelines, organized 
in a hierarchy of packages. An overview of the 
resulting framework structure is shown in figure 3. 
Another contribution to the safety process is the 
addition of work flows. The resulting library was 
used to arrange generic work flows, introducing 
sequences of tasks and activities. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Excerpt of Safety Framework 
 
 
Fig. 2. Process elements implementing the safety process in EPF 
 
Finally, the resulting safety process library, the 
work flows and an appropriate process 
configuration are used to publish processes. In EPF, 
a publication typically consists of HTML (Hyper 
Text Markup Language) output files, including full 
graphics showing all dependencies between tasks, 
roles, work products and other artefacts. All 
information is available in XML (Extensible 
Markup Language) format as well, in order to 
support other means of automated process 
enactment. The RTP Desktop for example could use 
this type of process description for automated 
orchestration and enactment. 
5    Requirements engineering 
Safety is, besides of the functional aspect, one of 
the major areas in the field of requirements 
engineering of the CESAR Project. It has been 
approached from different perspectives like 
ontology based support, formalization support and 
different analysis techniques ranging from virtual 
safety integration tests to fault tree generation. 
Furthermore special requirements from safety 
standards like ISO 26262 have been considered and 
the developed methods adapted to suit the needs. 
Main principle is always the early detection of 
safety relevant requirements and early analysability 
even without having an architecture available. 
CESAR supports such black-box characterization of 
systems by enforcing that (i) requirements can be 
defined only in terms of the interfaces of these 
systems and (ii) that – once a (preliminary) 
architecture is available – it can be checked against 
these requirements. Step (i) is supported by a 
formalization process that transforms natural 
language requirements into boilerplates and then 
uses the additional structure of these boilerplates to 
generate (instances of) requirement patterns for 
these. These patterns are equipped with a precise 
semantics (based on continuous-time traces of 
variables over discrete and continuous domains) 
fully removing ambiguity from requirement 
statements, and several checks are available to 
ensure – for instance – that they satisfy criterion (i) 
or that they are consistent. Step (ii) is supported by 
a virtual safety integration test that takes a 
preliminary architecture (with allocated 
requirements) and checks it against requirements 
resulting from step (i).  
Beyond unambiguous requirements, CESAR 
provides means for context dependencies in 
requirement specification that are typical for safety-
related standards like ARP 4754a (“A Safety Case 
communicates a clear, comprehensible and 
defensible argument that a system is acceptably 
safe to operate in a particular context”, “The 
agreement should define the interface behaviours 
that are to be provided when an input is received”): 
All requirements (and properties) come in the form 
of contracts consisting of promises expressing the 
needs for the system to be developed and 
assumptions about the context where (and how) the 
system is going to operate. For instance, the 
contract consisting of the assumption {CMD AS1 
fail, CMD AS2 fail} does not occur and {CMD AS1 
fail, VALID1 fail} does not occur and the promise 
{perm(CMD AS fail)} does not occur expresses the 
expectation that a permanent failure on the CMD 
output (of a braking system controller) does not 
occur provided none of the two double failures in 
the assumption occur. The benefit of the patterns is 
that – although they have a lot of natural language 
elements – they come equipped with a formal 
semantics. For instance, the above assumption is 
equivalent to the following LTL formula: 
 
¬(F (CMD AS1 fail)  F (CMD AS2 fail))   ¬(F 
(CMD AS1 fail)  F (VALID1 fail)) 
 
Thanks to these features it is possible to perform 
analyses on these patterns such as completeness and 
consistency, or analyses of fault propagation and 
impact on safety such as fault Tree Analysis. 
6    Preliminary assessment and way forward 
In addition to the system and process modelling 
activities described in section 3 and 4 as well as to 
the elaboration of safety oriented requirement 
engineering support as described in section 5, both 
being incorporated in the Reference Technology 
Platform, several use cases and scenarios have been 
defined by the industrial end-users so as to perform 
an assessment of the proposed technologies and 
tools. 
At this stage, incremental assessment has been 
performed on two successive versions of the RTP, 
mainly to support the refinement of the 
requirements towards the final version. These 
experiments include pilot applications from all 
covered domains e.g., door management system or 
flight warning system (aeronautics), on 
recuperation and on power train control unit for 
hybrid vehicles, airbag control unit, brake by wire 
(automotive), safe controllers in industrial 
automation, on-board traffic management unit in 
railway, or FDIR (Failure Detection, Isolation and 
Reconfiguration) definition and validation and 
incremental safety assessment (space). 
Though this assessment was performed in 
parallel to the actual incorporation of the 
innovations and their integration in the platform, 
and therefore mainly focussed on the assessment of 
basic techniques, methods and tools, it already 
provided important insights and better 
understanding of user expectations and remaining 
work. 
It appeared in particular that some model-based 
safety languages and tools such as AltaRica are 
very powerful and well suited to the addressed 
problems [21]. However their specialisation may be 
a drawback and other modelling approaches and 
languages more widely used for system and 
software engineering such as AADL (Architecture 
Analysis and Design Language), UML (Unified 
Modelling Language) or SysML (Systems 
Modelling language) could also be used, possibly 
with some adaptations and extensions [22]. We 
could for instance elaborate a prototype of an 
automatic transformation from space systems and 
FDIR AADL-based models (with specific 
adaptations and extensions for the purpose of the 
experiment) to timed automata so as to perform 
behavioural analysis and demonstration of 
properties on the temporal behaviour of the FDIR 
mechanisms [23]. These experiments and case 
studies confirm the validity and feasibility of the 
approaches investigated in the CESAR project, 
towards their integration in the final version of the 
Reference Technology Platform released at the end 
of 2011 for final assessment by the partners. 
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